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Introduction 
Joe Imperatori is talking to a Miami travel agent in the character-
istically low, breathy voice that prompted his co-workers at Eastern 
Air Lines to tag him "Whispering Joe." It is early summer 1989, 
and Joe and other striking Eastern workers are visiting travel 
agencies to convince them not to book passengers on Eastern or 
Continental Air Lines. With a calm, studious demeanor, Whis-
pering Joe politely explains how it would be in the best interest 
of the travel agency to book flights on more reliable a i r l ines-
ones that treat both their employees and passengers better than 
the two airlines owned by Frank Lorenzo. 
Whispering Joe is one of the original organizers of the 
Machinists' Travel Agency Committee in Miami. As co-chair, he 
is in charge of making sure teams of striking machinists and flight 
attendants visit nearly 1,000 travel agencies armed with special 
information packets. These packets divulge information on 
Continental's bad record of passenger complaints, lost baggage, 
and the losses that travel agencies could incur if Continental's poor 
performance caused Lorenzo to declare yet another bankruptcy 
in his fragile empire. 
Surprisingly, most travel agents were very supportive of the 
unions' position. But some had made the mistake of interpreting 
the strikers' politeness as lack of determination. Such was the case 
when the American Express Travel Agency began to give preferred 
treatment to Continental. As one of the IAM's picket captains, 
Whispering Joe helped organize a 1,000-person Jobs With Justice 
demonstration in front of the agency's downtown offices. 
Very few Machinist activists still had the day-in and day-out 
commitment and stamina that Joe did after three months of 
striking. Asked how he became such a good organizer, where he 
picked up his dogged commitment to fight Eastern management, 
and how he was able to successfully communicate to travel agents 
the complex business practices of Frank Lorenzo, Joe answers "the 
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E.C.T."—for the Eastern Machinists' "Efficiency Credit Team." 
The ECT is from another chapter of the IAM's history at Eastern. 
To journalists and other outsiders the ECT was from the "coopera-
tion period." To Joe and other Eastern Machinists, the ECT was 
from an era when the union negotiated a change in the power 
relations between labor and management. As Joe puts it, "For 18 
months the union ran the place better than management ever ran 
it." Joe and four other Machinists coordinated the Efficiency Credit 
Team's efforts at organizing the union's members to participate 
in managing the company. Joe modestly acknowledges that he and 
the other ECT coordinators are usually picked to direct special 
strike events because of their past reputations as good recruiters 
of volunteers in the ECT days. 
As we write, it's not clear how the final chapter will turn out 
at Eastern Air Lines. But what is clear and what this issue of Labor 
Research Review is all about is symbolized by the way Whispering 
Joe made the remarkable transition from a shop steward to 
essentially a union organizer. He and the other ECT members 
became union organizers not by trying to get workers at a non-
union company to vote the union in, but by getting union members 
at Eastern to participate in the management of the airline. 
Regardless of the outcome of the Eastern workers' battle with 
Frank Lorenzo, Whispering Joe and the other ECT activists are 
better prepared to take on a recalcitrant management precisely 
because they were active in the union-driven participation 
program at Eastern. 
We take most of this issue of Labor Research Review to argue 
that the labor movement has to create many, many more Whisper-
ing Joes and that unions can do that in the same way that 
Machinists District 100 did—by organizing their members to 
contest management's traditional prerogative to run, or to wreck, 
the workplaces upon which the livelihoods of workers depend. 
Management's own recently increased interest in "employee 
involvement" programs indicates that they are under tremendous 
pressure to manage better and are seeking new ways to accomplish 
traditional goals. In Chapters 1 and 2, we argue that cloaked in 
the rhetoric of "labor-management cooperation" and geared to 
extracting the shopfloor knowledge and insight of workers, these 
new management-initiated programs pose a threat to workers' 
rights and union power. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, however, we outline a union-empowering 
worker participation program which can take advantage of 
management's need to manage better. In Chapter 3 we argue that, 
against the advice of nearly all the "neutral" management 
t 
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consultants, worker participation should be modeled on the 
adversarial structures and traditions of collective bargaining. 
In Chapter 4 we show that worker participation requires union 
activists to learn and use many of the same worker mobilization 
skills that union organizers use to build unions in unorganized 
workplaces. Indeed, we assert that the real potential of union-
empowering worker participation programs lies in their ability to 
expedite the labor movement's transition from a service model 
of unionism to an organizing model. 
Seasoned organizers know that all organizing begins one-on-one 
at your base. The workplace is labor's base and, therefore, the 
key to the labor movement meeting its many challenges in the 
1990s—among them, building stronger worker-to-worker and 
union-to-union solidarity; being broadly perceived as a champion 
of the public's interest; and attracting large numbers of new 
workers into its fold. American society cannot be made better 
unless there is a thriving, more powerful labor movement. And 
before labor can help create this better society, it must first take 
care of its crumbling base. 
I 
Believe me, we*re 
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Should unions cooperate with management? This is said to be the 
key strategic question for the American labor movement as it 
struggles to survive the 20th Century. Both the federal Department 
of Labor and several states now fund programs to encourage 
"labor-management cooperation," and the business press is full 
of inspiring stories of "cooperation" making American workplaces 
more competitive. In response to this ideological onslaught, many 
unionists have accepted the terms of this debate and proclaim their 
acceptance or rejection of "cooperation" as a matter of principle. 
Such a debate is meaningless and diverts attention from the real 
problems and possibilities of the American labor movement. 
Whether to cooperate with management is always a tactical 
question for unions, one which bargaining committees routinely 
face in negotiating a new contract. Answering the question always 
depends on the specific terms of cooperation and an assessment 
of the relative strength of the union in relation to management. 
If, for example, management offers to cooperate by doubling wages 
and improving benefits across the board, cooperation is highly 
desirable. If, on the other hand, management seeks the union's 
cooperation in gutting wages and work rules, cooperation is not 
desirable, but the union has to assess whether it has the strength 
in a specific set of circumstances to defend its previous gains by 
striking. In reality, a practical decision on whether to cooperate 
with management depends on a complex assessment by union 
leaders and members of the specific terms and circumstances. 
A moment's reflection easily clarifies that whether to be more 
or less cooperative is not and cannot be a strategic issue for the 
labor movement. But the confusion is not an innocent one. There 
is a widespread and growing ideology of cooperationism that 
unionists properly reject. 
In every instance, the institutions and rhetoric of "labor-
management cooperation" actually refer to workplace programs 
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which are supposed to involve the participation of workers in 
decisions previously reserved for management. Cooperationism 
as an ideology uses the terms "cooperation" and "participation" 
interchangeably as if they referred to the same thing. In doing 
so, the potential of worker participation for empowering workers 
and unions and for changing the balance of power in the 
workplace is disguised. 
In this chapter we seek to remove that disguise and to point to 
the potential of worker participation for unions. 
The Origin of Cooperationism 
What today is called "labor-management cooperation" and 
ballyhooed as a "new industrial relations" had its origin in a bitter 
critique of Scientific Management by Ivy League business school 
academics, particularly those from Harvard, MIT and Cornell. 
Defining Scientific Management not in the narrow sense of 
industrial engineering and time-and-motion studies but in the 
broader sense in which all mainstream American management 
attempts to establish a rigorous and systematic control of all 
aspects of the labor process, these business school academics 
marshalled evidence that Scientific Management was undermining 
managerial efficiency. Trapped in an extremely top-down, com-
mand system of decision-making and communication, Scientific 
Management systematically suppresses information about and 
insight into the organization of work by those who do the work. 
As a result, product quality had gradually (but dramatically) 
declined, and productivity increases were increasingly difficult 
to attain. 
In many of the key documents of this academic critique, the 
Scientific Management approach was counterposed to 
"participative management," which would give workers more 
autonomy in their work and more input into decisions about the 
organization and management of work processes. Participative 
management, it was said, would unlock the suppressed potential 
of American workers and would thereby improve productivity and 
product quality while at the same time improving the quality of 
worklife. 
Coming from some of the most prestigious business schools in 
the country, and with some support from various government 
agencies, American managers could not ignore this critique of their 
practice. Neither could they ignore—particularly in the more 
competitive economic environment of the 1980s—the potential for 
productivity increases that some of the initial participative 
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management experiments had revealed. But the very terms of the 
critique challenged their self-esteem and many of the initial 
models of participative management seemed to involve 
management's giving up substantial control of the labor process. 
Management seemed to face a dilemma. In many places, partici-
pative management schemes were quite successful in dramatically 
increasing productivity, but they also seemed to threaten manage-
ment control. Business school advocates and a growing army of 
quality of worklife (QWL) consultants learned to respect this 
management fear and to design programs that addressed it from 
the very beginning. The trick for management was to get the 
productivity increases without losing any control. The trick for 
consultants was to assure management that this could be done. 
The result was the creation of the ideology of cooperationism. 
Below we argue that the key to productivity increases, cost 
reduction and quality improvement in participative management 
programs is the genuine participation of workers in the organi-
zation and management of their work. One of the main functions 
of cooperationism as an ideology is to hide this fact. Wherever 
genuine participation occurs, it should be called "cooperation," 
and cooperation should get the credit for increasing productivity, 
improving quality and reducing costs. Though in all the propa-
ganda about "the new industrial relations" there is usually a 
statement about the importance of workers participating in the 
organization and management of their work, the ideology of 
cooperationism always assures that in the final analysis of what 
makes these programs successful "cooperation," "trust," and 
"working together" are seen as the key, not the knowledge, insight 
or participation of the workers. 
Management's fear of losing control of a genuine participative 
process requires that "quality of worklife" programs be heavily 
encrusted with "jointness training" that ensures against their 
getting out of control. Chapters 2 and 3 of Mike Parker's book, 
Inside the Circle: A Union Guide to QWL, provide a brilliant 
exposure of the lengths to which management often will go and 
the sophistication involved in this training in cooperative attitudes. 
At many companies, such training is now an end in itself and 
involves little or no actual worker participation. The emphasis in 
this training is on workers and management cooperating to achieve 
common goals, but as Parker shows, both the goals and the process 
for achieving them are determined by management before the 
process is begun. 
The early term "participative management" is almost never used 
today and the biting edge of the original critique of American 
I 
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management practice has been nearly lost. In order to preserve 
both the self-esteem and the ultimate control of management, the 
language of "labor-management cooperation" has displaced the 
early rhetoric of worker participation. Both management and third-
party advocates and consultants have a vested interest in confusing 
participation and cooperation, in lumping them together, and in 
exaggerating the importance of cooperation. 
Participation & Cooperation at Eastern Airlines 
Nowhere is this more clear than in the public perception of one 
of the most famous cases of "participation/cooperation"—that of 
the Machinists at Eastern Air Lines in 1984-85. 
What Machinists District 100 did at Eastern in 1984-85 is widely 
(and correctly) acknowledged to be one of the most thorough and 
far-reaching attempts at worker participation thus far in the U.S. 
No union has ever been involved in participating in management 
in so many different ways—from representation on the board of 
directors and veto power over an initial business plan to a variety 
of shopfloor programs. Many aspects of the Machinists' programs 
are justly controversial within the labor movement because 
genuine participation in management poses many difficulties for 
U.S. trade union traditions. But it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to get to these issues through the cooperationist framework which 
has been systematically imposed on the Machinists' experience. 
A Department of Labor study conducted by a group of Harvard 
professors, Labor-Management Cooperation at Eastern Air Lines, 
is probably the worst example of this distortion, but it is a fairly 
obscure source. A better example for our purposes is a one-hour 
Frontline documentary, which aired on public television in 
November 1988, three months before the Machinists, the Air Line 
Pilots and the TVansport Workers struck Eastern. 
The Frontline film is a basically excellent and accurate narrative. 
We have used it—or pieces of it—in labor education classes and 
in strike support work. The first 35 minutes of the film trace events 
at Eastern from 1976, when Frank Borman became the CEO, 
through the "labor wars" of the early 1980s and the subsequent 
"cooperative period" in 1984-85, to the sale of the airline to Frank 
Lorenzo. The last 25 minutes detail Lor^ izo's cannibalizing of 
Eastern for the profit of his Texas Air holding company. Any 
careful viewer of the entire film is likely to come away with a 
strong sense of the incompetence (Borman) and venality (Lorenzo) 
of Eastern management during those years, with some sense of 
the potential of worker participation, and with considerable 
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sympathy for the unions. 
Though we suspect these are conclusions the filmmakers wanted 
the audience to arrive at, this is not the framework they put the 
Eastern experience in. The voice-over narrative introduces the 
experience as an experiment in "labor-management cooperation," 
not an experiment in worker participation or even "employee 
involvement," and it develops a firmly cooperationist storyline: 
Things were bad at Eastern when labor and management 
didn't cooperate with each other prior to 1984. They were 
good when labor and management did cooperate in 1984-85, 
and were bad again when ' 'both sides reverted to form'' and 
started fighting each other again. 
This basic storyline is not false in itself, but by not focusing on 
the terms of cooperation, it disguises wfrr things were good for 
both workers and the company during the 18 months that manage-
ment cooperated with a union-initiated and union-controlled 
worker participation program. A more accurate storyline would 
go like this: 
At the end of 1983, with Eastern on the edge of bankruptcy, 
I 
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District 100 of the Machinists granted massive (20%) wage 
concessions, but they insisted that in exchange management 
allow them to initiate a worker participation program that 
could address what they saw as widespread mismanagement 
of the company The worker participation program—not 
"cooperation"— i\Lcreased productivity, improved service and 
reduced costs, allowing Eastern to substantially reduce its 
losses in 1984 and to produce a profit for the first time in 
six years in 1985. Despite these recognized results, Borman 
abandoned the program. 
Though we do not have the space to discuss the Machinists' 
worker participation program in more detail here, the Frontline 
film itself shows key instances where management's cooperation 
was decidedly minimal and passive, while the workers' partici-
pation was clearly decisive. 
At Boston's Logan Airport, for example, Eastern management 
"cooperated" by disappearing. Union workers organized and 
managed their work without any supervision; besides increasing 
productivity through the elimination of the supervisors, all indi-
cators showed improved performance in all aspects of engine 
maintenance and ramp service. At most Eastern terminals, some 
management was present, but everywhere supervision was 
dramatically reduced and workers, given substantial autonomy 
and authority over their own work. 
In an altogether different program, Joe Imperatori and four 
other full-time union representatives ran a system-wide cost study 
team ("the ECT") that gathered and developed workers' ideas for 
saving the company money. There were no management represen-
tatives on this cost study team. Management's cooperation here 
consisted of paying the salaries of the five union reps and 
providing management information the union needed to develop 
proposals for cost savings. As the film shows, the union's cost study 
team saved Eastern more than $100 million with a variety of 
ideas—including by bringing back work that had been contracted 
out, repairing engine parts instead of replacing them with new 
parts, and rebidding supplier contracts. 
The "cooperative period" at Eastern revealed the scope and 
depth of management incompetence at Eastern. The broader 
significance of the Machinists' experience during this period has 
to do with what it suggests about the degree of mismanagement 
that may be rife in other workplaces and the potential of union-
led worker participation to correct it and thereby create the 
economic circumstances for enhanced wages, standards and job 
I 
Participating in Management 11 
security. 
The cooperationist version of this story turns it into its opposite. 
Gone is the focus on irrational management practices with which 
the acaderriyc critique of Scientific Management had begun. Gone 
is the potential value of expanding real workplace control by 
workers and their unions. In its place is a poignant, but woefully 
simplistic, lesson about the need to get along with others. 
This might not be that important except that the full-blown 
version of cooperationism ends up defining the problem with 
American workplaces not as management's fanatical and counter-
productive pursuit of control, but as the adversarial nature of the 
American labor relations system. In this version, one of the prime 
reasons for the decline of American industry in the 1980s is said 
to be that labor (meaning unions) and management are always 
fighting each other, and that if they just communicate better, work 
together and engage in joint problem-solving, they can produce 
higher quality products and services at lower costs. 
What is lost in this cooperationist interpretation is that 
cooperation between labor and management can take many 
different forms, most of which have little or no effect on improving 
production. Where production is improved it is because workers 
are providing knowledge and insight that is otherwise not available 
to management, and which in most workplaces is still contemp-
tuously ignored. 
Cooperation was important at Eastern in one sense, but not in 
the way cooperationism portrays it. When Borman and Eastern 
management refused to cooperate with the union's worker parti-
cipation program, it gradually died. But cooperation in and of itself 
produced nothing, it merely allowed the union-led participation 
program to operate. What improved both the operational and 
financial environment in the company was the participation of 
workers, led by their union, in decisions and practices that have 
traditionally been reserved for management. Because this 
threatened management's sense of control, because the terms of 
cooperation threatened managemt. it power, they withdrew their 
cooperation, even though the union program was improving all 
the things that management is supposed to care the most about— 
productivity, quality, costs, even profits. 
The Fog of Cooperationism 
We do not know the extent to which the ideology of coopera-
tionism has been consciously created to manipulate people and 
events. Journalists and many academics have a need to appear 
t 
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"balanced" in their presentations of labor-management relations; 
fingering mismanagement as the problem rather than the failure 
of the two sides to "cooperate" detracts from the appearance of 
balance, even if it happens to be true. Likewise, academic advo-
cates and consultants have learned to trim their criticism of 
management practice in order to sell their programs. 
Managers themselves are reluctant to recognize the full potential 
of worker participation because it undermines their self-esteem 
and could threaten their control. Our guess is that most managers 
are very ambivalent about these new programs. But if they are 
going to engage in them, their interests are served by disguising 
the value and potential of worker participation under a fog of 
cooperationist rhetoric. 
For unions cooperationism deflects their attention from the 
potential of worker participation to do exactly what Frank Borman 
and most managements fear the most: to change power relations 
in the workplace to the benefit of organized workers. 
Based on our experience teaching stewards and local union 
officers, the fog of cooperationism has penetrated deep into the 
labor movement. Most local leaders identify "worker partici-
pation" with "cooperation" and "cooperation," with concessions 
and a generally passive union stance. While rejecting this direction 
in theory, local leaders often accept it in practice. With employers 
capable of breaking strikes, closing plants and contracting work 
out, when management urges "cooperation" that includes what 
is said to be enhanced respect and involvement for workers—labor 
leaders at all levels see little choice but to cooperate with those 
managements who are willing to cooperate. 
While suspicious about management's motives and reluctant to 
invest any real trust, leaders passively accept management-
initiated programs which promise "participation" and "coopera-
tion." Hoping to be protected by certain safeguards, they go along 
with a management-designed program which is heavily influenced 
by management's fear of losing control. Such passive though 
suspicious acceptance of "cooperation/participation" is a 
dangerous course for unions. It puts management in control of 
a process which, as we argue in the next chapter, can strengthen 
management's control and weaken the union. 
We hope to show in subsequent chapters, however, that unions 
can use genuine worker participation to enhance worker and union 
power and as a first step in the revitalization of organized labor 
as a broad social movement. 
Chapter 2 
Who Will Control 
Shopfloor 
Knowledge? 
The union-initiated and union-controlled worker participation 
program at Eastern Air Lines shows that the real potential of 
participation is in tapping the knowledge and insight of workers 
to reform the organization and management of work. But most 
existing participative management programs are not like the one 
at Eastern. The typical offspring of "labor-management coopera-
tion" is a management-initiated program narrowly confined to 
localized shopfloor problems. Such a program was, in fact, present 
at Eastern, where it was called "employee involvement" (EI); it 
was largely irrelevant to the genuine participation program 
developed by the union and was of little value to either the 
company or the workers. 
The typical management-initiated program (whether called 
"quality of worklife," "employee involvement," "labor-
management participation teams," or "quality circles") divides the 
workforce into small groups of workers who work in the same 
or related areas. After some training, a talk process is initiated 
through which ideas for improving things are supposed to be 
generated, developed and then (maybe) implemented. 
Beyond this general form of small groups talking about possible 
improvements, there is little uniformity. The mission of the groups, 
for example—that is, what is to be improved—varies substantially 
from program to program. Sometimes the program focuses the 
talk on one narrow issue—how to improve quality, for example. 
Sometimes the focus is quite amorphous, and the group will deal 
with anything that comes up. 
The way the group meetings are conducted also can vary greatly. 
Management is usually represented either by a full-time QWL or 
EI facilitator or by specially trained front-line supervisors, but the 
role management representatives play varies. Sometimes the 
manager runs the meeting and gives firm direction to the discus-
sion. Sometimes an hourly worker is selected to lead the group, 
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and management is just there to observe and to offer suggestions. 
Just as the stated mission of the small group talk process varies, 
so do underlying management motives. In many workplaces top 
management merely purchases a consultant's cooperation/partici-
pation program "off the shelf" in the vague hope that it will 
improve employee relations and productivity; in such cases top 
management merely requires middle and front-line management 
to cooperate with the consultants and often has little or no idea 
of what is actually going on. In other instances, management is 
upfront and well-focused on what it wants—"we need your ideas 
in order to improve productivity." In nonunion workplaces, such 
small groups have been used for intelligence-gathering and anti-
union propaganda to defeat union organizing drives. As Guillermo 
Grenier reveals in his case study of a Johnson & Johnson plant 
in New Mexico, such a hidden management agenda involves a 
form of sophisticated psychological warfare that could legitimately 
be called "brainwashing." (See Inhuman Relations: Quality Circles 
and Anti-Unionism in American Industry.) Likewise, the long-term 
management goal may be to use these groups to condition workers 
to identify with management goals and to undermine the "us-vs.-
them" attitude so essential to unionism. 
Because there are so many variations, it is difficult to make firm 
generalizations about the character of these programs. The 
consultants have various controversies about the best processes, 
structures and techniques, as each seeks to sell his or her program. 
"Team concept," which is all the rage in auto assembly at the 
moment, further confuses things. Though lumped with QWL and 
EI as part of the new, more cooperative industrial relations, it is 
not built around a talk process or a "team" in any commonly 
accepted sense of that word; rather, on the evidence presented 
by Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter in Choosing Sides: Unions and 
the Team Concept, it appears to be a highly coordinated speed-
up with an overlay of fancy technological and employee relations 
gimmicks. 
"Team concept" aside, what is the record of the QWL-EI (talk 
process) type of programs? It is very mixed. On the one hand, the 
vast majority of these programs achieve little and are either 
abandoned or become dormant. (See Parker, Inside the Circle, pp. 
131-139, and Kochan, Katz & McKersie, The Transformation of 
American Industrial Relations, pp. 153-157.) Empirical studies that 
have tried to measure the overall success of these kinds of 
programs are unreliable because they do not differentiate between 
the different character of various programs. On the other hand, 
there are a number of specific cases where some sort of "employee 
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involvement" program has had dramatic results in improving 
productivity, quality and/or cost (Eastern gets counted this way, 
even though the official "employee involvement" program was 
insignificant). 
It is these success stories that have stimulated management's 
interest. But, as we have tried to show above, there is great con-
fusion about what causes the success. Managements, consultants 
and outside observors seem to want to avoid the conclusion that 
the knowledge and insight of workers is key. Rather the majority 
view seems to be that what makes these programs work (when 
they work) is a certain attitude adjustment on the part of both 
workers and managers—an adjustment that involves greater trust, 
more involvement by workers, and greater cooperation between 
workers and management. 
Our view is the opposite of this. In many places, QWL-type 
programs have achieved significant success in changing attitudes 
in the way management wanted, but have not substantially 
affected productivity, quality or costs. Where there has been 
success in these areas, it is because the knowledge and insight 
of workers has had a direct impact on changing the way the work 
is actually done. 
Our own view is that a process of gathering and developing 
worker knowledge and insight has tremendous potential for 
whoever controls it, and that neither most managements nor most 
unions realize this yet. Most existing programs aim at changing 
attitudes rather than at gathering and processing worker 
knowledge and insight. Thus, based on extensive studies of these 
programs, Parker and Slaughter conclude: "The new cooperative 
programs are less about gleaning workers' ideas about production 
than about reshaping workers' ideas about themselves and their 
bosses." [Guardian Book Supplement, Summer 1988) But this is 
why most such programs are ineffective. 
As we have suggested above, it is very hard for management 
to recognize the real potential of worker knowledge and insight. 
But when and if they do, these small group talk processes can be 
transformed in ways that will substantially increase management 
control of the production process. On the other hand, if unions 
can control such a process, it can empower workers and put unions 
in a position to significantly change the balance of power between 
labor and management. 
One of the best ways to explain this is to recount an exchange 
that happened in one of Metzgar's labor education classes several 
years ago. In a concrete situation, it shows both the danger and 
the potential of participative management processes for unions. 
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How Would Maggie Handle It? 
Though she looked a couple decades younger, Maggie was in 
her early 60s then. She had worked at Hart, Schaffner & Marx 
in Chicago for more than three decades and had been a steward 
for her ACTWU local for two of those decades. By her own 
account (which was confirmed by two other ACTWU stewards 
in the class) she was a bit of a legend in the company for her ability 
to sew the crotch in men's pants. As she explained it, the company 
wanted a "bubble" in the crotch and she could produce that 
bubble better and quicker than any other Hart, Schaffner sewer. 
Over the years, she had been subjected to a series of earnest 
young industrial engineers standing over her trying to see what 
she was doing to produce that bubble. She took great pleasure in 
making monkeys out of the IEs, as she had two ways to sew the 
crotch—the regular way, which produced a good bubble but took 
the average amount of time, and her "special trick," which was 
much faster and produced a superior bubble. Usually, when an 
IE was present, she would sew only in the regular way. But every 
once in a while, as she said, "just to prove my hand was quicker 
than his eye," she'd do it the fast way. When this happened, the 
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IE would get agitated and insist that she do it again, while she 
insisted she didn't know what he was talking about. To hear these 
seasoned ACTWU clothing workers tell it, this was great enter-
tainment for everybody in the area, and they used to look forward 
to the arrival of the time-and-motion study man. 
More recently, the company had installed television cameras, 
and Maggie knew that her hand was not quicker than that eye, 
which could be played back in slow motion. The union filed 
grievances against the cameras, and eventually the company had 
to limit the amount of time they were in use and to install a bell 
that indicated when the camera was on. In the meantime, Maggie 
had to work without using her trick at all, and this made her 
miserable. By using her trick, she could pace her work, piling up 
men's pants and then resting while still making her quota. She 
could also help others in her group pace their work, by helping 
them out based on her bank of bubbled crotches. Working without 
it robbed her and them of substantial control over their work. 
The company, of course, wanted Maggie's "special trick" so that 
they could make her and all other sewers do it all the time. 
When in class Metzgar introduced participative management 
schemes as an antidote to scientific management, Maggie 
scratched her head. Metzgar argued that by systematically 
suppressing the insight and initiative of workers, scientific 
management had now reached a dead-end. It could no longer 
produce the kind of productivity gains management wanted 
because its insistence on top-down control of the workforce 
resulted in all sorts of irrational work procedures. One of the best 
parts of the class was always when students were asked to give 
one example of where management makes them do things the 
wrong way—wrong, from management's point of view, assuming 
management values productivity, quality and reduced costs. Not 
only did such examples always flood out of people, they were told 
with such passion that it was clear that these frontline union 
leaders were constantly frustrated with management stupidity. 
But Maggie didn't get it. She told the class about her special trick, 
and concluded, "I don't see how this participative management 
stuff is so different from scientific management. They couldn't 
get my trick by watching me, so now they're going to get me in 
one of these small groups and get me to tell them. No way. I'm 
not that dumb. Nobody's that dumb." 
METZGAR: "You might not give up your trick—because you 
know how valuable it is. But you might give up a lot of information 
that you don't know the value of. Besides, the group could put 
a lot of pressure on you to give up your trick. What if the company 
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were threatening to close the plant? 
MAGGIE: "I've never told anybody, and I've had lots of pressure 
from my workmates to tell." (The other two ACTWU stewards 
nodded to confirm this.) "My idea is that when I retire, I'll show 
one person how to do it. It's not hard to do. It's so simple, it's 
disgusting. Maybe I'll give it to Isabelle or Georgia (the other two 
ACTWU stewards) if they treat me right," she said with a smile. 
"But its got to be somebody responsible—somebody who will 
know how to use it." 
METZGAR: "But what if the plant were going to be shutdown? 
Let's say the company said that unless it was able to reduce costs 
by $1 million, it was going to shut down the plant. Let's say the 
union had their own experts examine the company's books, and 
the union concluded that the threat was real. And, let's say the 
company said your trick was worth a million dollars to that plant. 
Would you give it to them then?" 
MAGGIE: (without a moment's thought) "No!" 
METZGAR: "Huh?" 
MAGGIE: "I would never give it to them. Once they have it, 
its theirs. They can do anything they want with it. They can use 
it at another plant and shut ours down anyway. What I'd do is 
I'd get a group of the best workers together, in the union hall, and 
I'd tell them, and I'd make them swear that they would never tell 
management, and I'd explain how to protect it from management. 
The company could have their million dollars, if that would save 
the plant, but I'd never give them my trick." 
The Maggie Model 
Maggie was an extraordinary person—a charismatic black 
woman who had started her worklife in the late 1940s and ended 
it in the early 1980s. She had been part of the beginning, middle 
and end of the organizing phases of the labor, civil rights and 
women's movements, and in her conversation she constantly 
referred back to the way things were in order to explain how things 
are. She was also in possession of an extraordinarily valuable piece 
of craft knowledge, which the company's time-and-motion study 
process over the years had made even more palpable to her. 
When we speak of tapping the knowledge and insight of workers 
to improve production, it is not this sort of individually valuable 
"special trick" we have in mind. Rather, we refer to a much more 
complex process of interaction among workers which pools 
knowledge and insight to develop new ways of doing things. But 
Maggie's single piece of highly valuable craft knowledge allows 
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us to see certain relationships and dynamics that are usually more 
difficult to see. And the way she responded to the hypothetical 
situation she was confronted with provides a model of good trade 
union practice. 
First, Maggie highlighted the danger of sharing worker 
knowledge and insight with management. These small group talk 
processes can produce all sorts of information and suggestions that 
can enhance management's control of both the workforce and the 
production process. Once management has knowledge that only 
workers had before, it can do with it what it will, including moving 
it. There is, in fact, a phenomenon of QWL-type programs 
appearing just before a plant is closed. David Simmons, one of 
LRR's editors, was a UE local officer at Westinghouse in Chicago 
as it was closing down; he thinks management's motive in 
introducing a QWL program shortly before the shutdown was to 
undermine worker militancy in challenging the shutdown. Maybe. 
But Mike Matuszak, who worked at Ingersoll-Rand in South Bend 
through its shutdown, is convinced that I-R management used its 
Quality Circle program to extract knowledge that it was then able 
to use at its nonunion plants in North and South Carolina. (See 
Grand Designs: The Corporate Assault on Local Unions, ed. 
Charles Craypo.) 
"l wantta open up better lines of communication 
with my employees. Plant these listening devices 
in all -the washrooms." 
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Management motives vary, and from what we've seen and been 
told about, most managements are much more interested in these 
talk processes for their psychological value than for the hard 
currency of knowledge that can be derived from them. But it 
doesn't really matter, does it? The danger is there, regardless of 
what management's motives are. To facilitate a management-
directed process where workers sit around and give away their 
knowledge and insight is just not good union practice. There is 
a long history of workers, both with and without unions, 
developing ways to protect their knowledge from management's 
grasp. It is part of what gives workers, organized or unorganized, 
some control and dignity on the job. The very presence of manage-
ment in these group meetings should be as abhorrent to unions 
as it was to Maggie—always and on principle. 
This is where Maggie drew the line—sharing her knowledge 
with management. But there are situations where workers need 
to improve production in order to protect their jobs. Maggie 
recognized this in principle in the way she responded to Metzgar's 
hypothetical situation. The principle she assumed is a good one 
for such situations: Give management the result that is required, 
but do everything you can to hide the process by which the result 
is achieved. This is a somewhat difficult principle to articulate 
clearly, but it is one that we have found is widely understood by 
shopfloor union leaders. Another example may clarify this: 
In 1982, in the midst of the steel industry's great depression, 
local management at U.S. Steel's Johnstown Works asked USWA 
Local 1288 for a one-time waiver of certain work rules so that the 
plant could bid lower for a specific machining job. The waiver 
would affect some 15 workers, and the local grievance chair met 
with them to discuss the proposal. After thorough discussion, 
here's how they responded: They would not waive any w »rk rules, 
but if management agreed to withdraw all supervision while they 
worked on this one particular job, management could go ahead 
and bid the job at a severely reduced number of hours. They would 
produce the work in that number of hours, so long as management 
made no attempt to find out how they did it. 
As this was explained to us, the workers thought they were 
giving up quite a lot just by admitting that the job could be done 
much more productively than it had been. And they could see 
from the work rules that management had designated to be waived 
(which in their view would not have increased productivity much) 
that management had not the foggiest idea of how best to do the 
work. Thus, given that the plant was losing money and in danger 
of being shut down (which it eventually was), they were willing 
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to give management the result it wanted, but not the means for 
achieving that result in the future. 
Such hair-splitting distinctions may sound strange to the public, 
and to all too many unionists for that matter. The only reason 
Maggie was willing to share her trick with other workers was 
because the plant was in danger of being shut down. Likewise, 
the steelworkers were only willing to work at maximum efficiency 
when faced with the permanent loss of their jobs. Shouldn't these 
workers have been improving quality and productivity all along? 
Wasn't Maggie's hiding of her trick depriving the company of 
productivity increases that would have made it "more 
competitive" as well as depriving thousands, maybe millions, of 
men of better bubbles in their crotches? Isn't this kind of nit-
picking defensiveness by workers and their unions precisely what 
has undermined U.S. industry? 
What the public does not understand is the complex interest 
workers and unions have in productivity. Maggie kept her trick 
to herself not only because it enhanced her own and others control 
of their work, but because once the company had it they could 
impose it everywhere and the resulting productivity increases 
would have meant job losses. Maggie's own job was not in 
jeopardy because she had high seniority, but she saw it as her duty 
to her fellow workers to deny management the productivity 
enhancements inherent in the widespread application of her trick. 
When faced with a plant closing, on the other hand, where 
everybody's job would be lost, Maggie was willing to give some 
ground, though not as much as management would have wanted. 
Around the issue of productivity is where all the talk about 
"working together" and "the mutual interests of labor and 
management" breaks down. Unions and workers do have an 
interest in increasing productivity, but it is not and can never be 
as unambiguous as management's. Management always has an 
interest in as much productivity as possible—that is, in the greatest 
amount of (quality?) product for the least amount of hours worked. 
Workers have an interest in increasing productivity only to the 
degree that productivity growth is necessary to support increased 
standards of living and/or to preserve the long-term viability of 
their workplace. Unions, in order to be effective, need to be able 
to put workers in a position to regulate productivity growth, and 
to react collectively to situations as they change. 
The basic logic of productivity growth is radically different for 
workers and management. For management, while productivity 
growth is sometimes more important than others, it is always a 
desirable goal; management needs no further information to 
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decide if large increases in productivity are desirable at any give 
time. The situation is the opposite for workers. If, for example, 
the market for the product you produce is growing dramatically, 
steady productivity increases will not eliminate jobs and, by 
reducing the unit costs of production, will increase profits that 
organized workers can fight for a share of through wage-and-
benefit increases. If, on the other hand, the market for your 
product is stagnant or declining, productivity increases will result 
in job losses, while the lack of productivity growth, by keeping 
prices relatively high, may further erode the market, which will 
also result in job losses. In other words, workers always need more 
information—information about the market, about the financial 
condition of the company and its operating costs—before they can 
decide what amount of productivity increase, if any, is in their 
best interests. 
For most of the years since World War II, union workers in the 
major industries faced something like the first scenario described 
above. With markets expanding, workers, consumers and 
employers all could benefit from productivity increases. Since 
somewhere in the mid-1970s, however, workers have more and 
more faced something like the second scenario—which, in the 
language of the cooperationists, is basically a "lose-lose" situation 
for workers and their unions. In this situation, unions need more 
information, not less, more control over business decisions at the 
top levels, and a much more organized and cohesive workforce 
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at the shopfloor level. 
Maggie's response to Metzgar's hypothetical situation provides 
a model for unions in today's circumstances. She could see the 
need, in a changed situation, to give up her decades-long fight to 
deny the company the productivity increases her knowledge and 
insight could provide. But that didn't mean giving up everything— 
work rules and all the shopfloor tactics and strategies she had 
developed through years of experience—and turning to some 
vague "trust" and "cooperation" over which she and her 
workmates had no control. Rather, she insisted on moving the fight 
to a new terrain, one that required gathering "the best workers 
together, in the union hall." 
Maggie had kept her special trick to herself for two kinds of 
reasons. One had to do with the advantage it gave her over other 
workers, and she was frank about this, justifying it by her "respon-
sible" use of it. But she was also well aware of the difficulty of 
controlling its use, of denying it to management, with each 
additional person who knew. She was well aware of the risk 
involved in sharing it, even in the union hall. But she saw it as 
the union's responsibility to organize the workers into a disciplined 
and cohesive group who could collectively protect what she had 
individually protected before. 
In subsequent conversation, Maggie expressed her scepticism 
that this could be done effectively, since it needed to get into the 
hands of only one "fink" or one careless worker to be gone forever. 
But Maggie's "special trick" was vulnerable in a way that the more 
typical and more complex process of pooling worker insight and 
knowledge is not. The question is whether unions can effectively 
organize and control such a process—one that is not a matter of 
simply providing a service to their members on an individual case-
by-case basis, the way the grievance procedure does, but one that 
requires systematic and disciplined internal organizing of rank-
and-file workers. 
In our view, this is the question on which the future of unionism 
in the United States will turn. If unions don't learn how to organize 
and control the collective knowledge and insight of their members 
to improve production, managements—despite their inherent 
disadvantages—will. So far, managements have been limited by 
their own ego insecurity, their fear of losing control, and by the 
distrust of workers, based on experience, of giving up knowledge 
and insight that management can use against them. But these 
disadvantages will not last forever. Following Maggie's model, 






Current models of ''participation/cooperation" all claim that 
effective worker participation programs involve a process that is 
entirely different from collective bargaining. Whereas bargaining 
is said to be adversarial, worker participation is seen as necessarily 
cooperative and involves building trust between workers and 
management. This proscription against modeling participation on 
bargaining not only disarms any potential for strengthening the 
union through such programs, it distorts the character of collective 
bargaining itself. 
Collective bargaining is a process through which adversaries 
cooperate. Just as two warring countries agree to negotiate their 
differences rather than battling each other to the death, collective 
bargaining is a negotiating process between adversaries with 
conflicting interests. As an adversarial process, each side is 
expected to pursue its own interests, and the common interest will 
be arrived at through the give and take of negotiations. When the 
adversaries cannot negotiate a satisfactory settlement, they go to 
war with each other—through strikes or lockouts. 
Though adversarial, collective bargaining does not exclude 
cooperation with management. In fact, a labor contract sets the 
terms and conditions upon which labor and management agree 
to cooperate for a designated period of time. But in collective 
bargaining, cooperation between labor and management is not 
some touchy-feely encounter group with labor and management 
representatives interspersed in a circle. Labor is on one side of 
the table and management, on the other. Both management and 
labor realize that the terms of cooperation they negotiate will be 
determined by the relative strength (and bargaining skill) of each 
party. If the union is weak and the members are not united, the 
terms of the contract will favor management. If the workers are 
united and management cannot shift work elsewhere or hire 
replacement workers, the new contract will favor the union. 
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Worker participation programs should proceed on the same 
premises. What management needs is the knowledge and insight 
workers can bring to the improvement of production processes. 
If it were to ask the union to organize its members to provide that 
knowledge and insight, it would be clear that this is a bargaining 
demand. It would also be clear—as it should be anyway—that the 
knowledge and insight of workers has a dollar value to the 
company and if workers are going to give value to the company, 
they should get something in return. The rhetoric and ideology 
of cooperationism hides these realities. Approaching worker parti-
cipation from a bargaining perspective can help reveal them. 
Later in this chapter we will outline a worker participation 
program modeled on a traditional adversarial labor relations 
structure, but let's first look at some preliminary issues and ask: 
How would this be handled if it were seen as analogous to 
collective bargaining? 
Goals of the Program 
In bargaining, the process begins with both sides laying their 
demands—their goals—on the table. Likewise, in participative 
management programs, the goals of the program should be clearly 
and precisely stated. 
Vague goals like "enhancing our human resources" or "creating 
a cooperative atmosphere conducive to trust and mutual respect" 
should be dismissed out of hand as goals which can be 
accomplished through traditional bargaining relationships. Such 
management goals are always intermediate, means toward other 
ends. Assuming that management's ultimate aim is not to enhance 
its own control by undermining union power and influence 
(which, given the history of these programs, no union can afford 
to assume), management's ultimate goal is going to be to improve 
its financial situation—its profits in the private sector or its ability 
to live within (politically determined) budgetary constraints in the 
public sector. The specific management goals of a participative 
management program are, therefore, likely to be one or all three 
of the following: 
—to increase productivity. 
—to improve quality (and consistency). 
—to reduce costs. 
Clearly stated in this way the union is in a position to adopt, 
reject or modify any of management's goals and to propose union 
goals. There are four such goals unions should lay on the table. 
First, we believe cost savings should also be a union goal. If labor 
and management both share this cost reduction goal in order to 
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improve the financial situation of the enterprise (private or public), 
then it is obvious from a union perspective that the participative 
management program must have the capacity to focus on all the 
costs of doing business. Management will instinctively pursue 
savings only in labor costs and through productivity increases. 
Unions must insist that programs shift from this narrow focus to 
a broader definition of cost savings in the company. 
This broader definition implies the second union goal: to gain 
influence at all levels and areas of decision-making in the enter-
prise. Important areas such as purchasing, sales and marketing, 
engineering, investment and finance need to be included in the 
program design. Corporate performance in these areas has a 
tremendous impact on the ability of unions to bargain over wages, 
benefits and job security. Unions must begin to develop expertise 
in these areas just as they have developed expertise through 
bargaining over production work rules and compensation 
packages. By gaining access to daily information and input into 
decisions in these nontraditional areas, unions can eventually 
influence long-term corporate planning. 
Third, unions should insist that the program advances the 
union's pursuit of its traditional interests such as enhanced job 
security, improved wages and benefits, an improved work 
environment, and a stronger union. Most El-type programs have 
language which broadly embrace worker-oriented goals, hut very 
few make mention of union goals. Insisting on structuring the 
program to strengthen the union is essential to testing 
management's motivation. If management's ultimate goal is to 
undermine the union, it will likely lapse into surprising 
indifference toward reducing costs when faced with a union-
empowering program. 
Fourth, to ensure the union's ability to reach these three goals, 
the union must have structural control over the insights and 
knowledge of the workforce. If management's ultimate goal is to 
improve the enterprise's financial situation and if this goal is 
legitimately related to union goals such as job security, then both 
goals should be accepted. But, following "Maggie's model," the 
union should strive to give management the result that is required 
without giving it control of the process by which the result is 
produced. The union should clearly articulate from the beginn-
ing that one of its primary goals is to strengthen the union and 
to enhance workers' power over the fate of the enterprise. In order 
to achieve this, any shop floor component of the participative 
program should structurally exclude management from a direct 
relationship with the rank-and-file—just as a healthy bargaining 
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relationship does not allow management to sell its contract 
demands directly to the membership. 
Thus, by designing a multi-level program that gives the union 
the opportunity to organize the workers to collectively control their 
own knowledge and insight, the union will be able to pursue 
nonlabor cost savings, on the basis of which it can improve its 
bargaining position. 
Consultants & Staffing 
No union would agree to have a "neutral" lawyer preside over 
contract negotiations. Rather, management has its lawyers and 
economists, and the union has its own. Likewise, unions should 
reject any notion of a neutral or joint consultant. At worst, these 
self-proclaimed experts will really be management stooges. At best 
they will promote their own agendas, which invariably include 
the creation of a "culture of cooperation and trust" that confuses 
more than it clarifies. Very often these same consultants can be 
useful if they are identified and function as management's 
consultants, while unions identify and hire their own consultants 
to help train and implement the/r part of the participation 
program. 
The union should make it clear from the beginning that its 
resources for union consultants and lost time for union coordi-
nators should be equal to those of management. The union will 
usually need at least one full-time coordinator to act as its chief 
advocate in the day-to-day operation of the participation program. 
It is this person's primary function to insure that the program is 
used to help the union accomplish its overall bargaining and 
internal organizing objectives. Shopfloor facilitators should be 
selected by the union as if they were assistant shop stewards. 
This implies that union-selected coordinators and facilitators will 
become vitally important union leaders. First, they must assert 
the union's perspective in these nontraditional areas. Second, 
union coordinators are responsible for organizing the knowledge 
and insight of rank-and-file workers to formulate appropriate 
union proposals for cost reduction, higher product quality, and 
work environment improvements. Third, these union represen-
tatives will play a crucial role in mobilizing the membership 
behind union-initiated programs to correct mismanagement at all 
levels. 
Training & Meetings 
It is impossible to imagine contract negotiations where the 
parties never met separately, where all meetings included both 
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management and union representatives, and where union nego-
tiators discussed the pros and cons of management's latest 
proposal amongst themselves while management representatives 
were present. And yet this is exactly how most QWL/EI programs 
are conducted. 
"Neutral" consultants will insist to the union that all training 
and all meetings be jointly attended by management and workers. 
What they don't like to bring up is the fact that management has 
many meetings, strategy sessions, and training sessions from 
which the union is excluded. 
Again, using a collective bargaining analogy results in a very 
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different practice. As much of the training as possible should be 
separate from management. Stewards and committeepersons 
should be trained alongside the union coordinators and facilitators, 
and it should be made clear to the coordinators and facilitators 
that their role is to assist the stewards and the union executive 
board. The primary objective in the training is to emphasize the 
entire group's role in pushing the union's internal organizing 
agenda. 
Some of the group leadership skills, statistical methods and 
problem-solving techniques that are common in most QWL 
programs can be extremely valuable, shorn of the cooperationist 
baggage that usually comes with them. (See Chapters 2 & 3 of 
Inside the Circle). Particular attention should be given to training 
facilitators and stewards on obtaining management information 
vital to the union's cost-saving efforts. 
Likewise, no union bargaining committee worth its salt would 
enter a bargaining session without first mapping out its objectives 
and strategies. Facilitators should meet separately with the rank 
and file to generate proposals, gather management information 
necessary to develop the proposals, and then meet with the union 
steering committee to assess which proposals should be brought 
to the joint labor-management committee and pushed by the 
union. The union must have its own strategy at all levels of the 
program prior to any joint meetings. 
Union-Empowering Models of Participation 
The key to a union-empowering worker participation program 
is the structural exclusion of management from a direct relation-
ship with the rank and file. This allows the members to hide their 
knowledge from the boss. It keeps management from screwing 
up the program, and it clearly identifies the participation program 
as the union's, not as a nebulous joint program. Any jointness in 
a union-initiated program should be the same type of jointness 
that exists when unions meet with management on joint safety 
committees or joint health and welfare committees. Jointness 
occurs at the representative level, not at the rank-and-file level. 
By keeping these programs away from both company super-
visors and "neutral" facilitators, the union can eliminate their 
potential for the kind of cooperationist attitude adjustment that 
so many managements seem to be after. Moreover, management 
will not be able to offer workers a new structure which encourages 
members to bypass the union and approach management directly 
to resolve problems. 
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By excluding management from shopfloor level teams and 
making these teams accountable to all the workers through the 
union structure, unions can systematically address the wide 
variety of irrational management practices which are undermining 
so many American workplaces, while at the same time expanding 
and revitalizing themselves as institutions of representative 
democracy. Three distinct workplace models have emerged to 
accomplish this goal—the special task force model (STF), the 
autonomous work group (AWG) and the area-wide union commit-
tee (AUC). Combined in a unified structure, these three forms of 
worker participation can empower workers and their unions. 
The Special Task Force 
The special task force is set up to look at special systemwide 
or nonshopfloor problems. Appointed by a union steering com-
mittee, the task force's mission is defined by a particular problem 
identified either by management or by the union. STFs should 
have access to all necessary company information dealing with 
the problem and will usually require assistance from management 
specialists (such as engineers or financial analysts) as well as help 
from outside experts. But the task force itself is composed of union 
members only. Members of the union steering committee must 
have a thorough understanding of the company's annual budget, 
the business plan and industry data to be able to choose 
appropriate realms for STF activity. The task force approach is 
particularly appropriate for looking into traditional management 
areas like investment, purchasing or production planning. 
The Machinists' Efficiency Credit Team (ECT) at Eastern Air 
Lines is an example of the special task force approach. The ECT 
acted as a union steering committee and created many special task 
forces. Many of the task forces achieved cost savings by bringing 
new work into the company, what the Machinists called ' 'contrac-
ting in." Others found ways to repair rather than replace used 
parts. One task force initiated a reorganization of the airlines' 
inventory system, and another saved thousands of dollars by 
finding a supplier who sold tiny air-conditioning filters for three 
cents that the company had been purchasing for $5 apiece. At one 
point middle management formed its own cost-saving team to 
compete with the union's ECT. When they couldn't generate 
enough cost-savings to justify their own salaries, they tried to 
solicit ideas from the workforce. Through its steward system, the 
union spread the word to make sure that all cost-saving ideas came 
through the ECT. Cut off by the rank and file, the management 
team was disbanded. (See "Machinists vs. Mismanagement," 
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Labor Research Review #10, pp. 85-101.) 
Another example of the task force approach is what UAW Local 
686 at Harrison Radiator in Lockport, New York, did when faced 
with a management threat to outsource an entire department. 
Forming a cost study team made up of union workers in the 
affected department, the union solicited ideas from the workforce 
and in three weeks developed 25 proposals for cutting costs. Since 
the team met independently of management, it was able to 
prioritize its list of proposals and give management only its top 
three ideas, which were enough to make the internal operation 
less expensive than the bid submitted by an outside contractor, 
and thus enough to save their jobs. The control the union members 
retained by excluding supervisors allowed them to keep secret the 
22 additional cost-savings ideas their cost study team had 
generated. (See A Fighting Chance, pp. 33-50.) 
The Harrison cost study team and the Eastern efficiency credit 
team illustrate how a union special task force model allows labor 
to improve the financial condition of an enterprise without giving 
management access to workers' insight and knowledge. What 
makes this model valuable is its ability to deal with multi-level 
issues inside the company. On the other hand, it does not provide 
the union with a broad day-to-day structure with which it can 
organize its members. 
Autonomous Work Groups 
Autonomous work groups go one step further than STFs in 
keeping workers' knowledge from management. In union-oriented 
autonomous work groups, supervision is withdrawn and the 
workers organize and manage the work themselves. All existing 
work rules are formally preserved, but without supervision 
present, workers are free to do the work in the most efficient way 
they deem possible. This is what USWA Local 1288 proposed for 
one job at the Johnstown Works of U.S. Steel. At Eastern during 
the "cooperative" period, this was a permanent arrangement for 
mechanics and ramp servicers. 
Known as the "lead/supervisor program," Eastern management 
and the IAM agreed to transfer non-disciplinary supervisory 
functions to the chief stewards and to "lead workers" who were 
selected partly on the basis of seniority and partly by the desires 
of the work group. To avoid sabotage by first-line supervisors, the 
IAM and Eastern top management agreed to reduce actual super-
visors through attrition and in the meantime to transfer as many 
as possible to other non-bargaining unit titles. When the 
Machinists discovered that there was no training program for 
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Eastern supervisors, they developed their own manual and training 
program for lead workers. 
There are three obstacles to AWGs being broadly accepted as 
a model for union-empowering participation programs. First and 
foremost, management will rarely agree to an approach which 
leaves workers totally unsupervised company-wide. Second, 
autonomous work groups are not appropriate for all workers. 
Many workers want a more structured environment in which they 
are accountable to one person as opposed to an entire group. Third, 
by its very area-specific structure, an AWG will be forced to focus 
more on labor-oriented problems than on larger cost-savings and 
mismanagement issues at other areas and levels in the organi-
zation. Thus, while AWGs might be pursued by unions in work 
areas where management exposure to workers' knowledge and 
insight makes the workforce especially vulnerable, they are not 
applicable as a universal model for worker participation. 
The Area-wide Union Committee 
There is one worker participation structure similar to the 
autonomous work group which overcomes these complications 
while still allowing the union to retain most of the positive aspects 
of AWGs. The area-wide union committee (AUC), like the 
autonomous work group, is based in a single work area and 
interacts within a single work group. The AUC is part of the 
union's structure, so the union selects all representatives to the 
committee, typically the steward for the area and two or three 
others who act as assistant stewards on the committee. By using 
internal organizing techniques such as canvassing and small group 
meetings with the rank and file, the AUCs gather and process 
worker knowledge and insight in their work area. 
Though management is prohibited from directly soliciting 
suggestions and ideas from the rank and file, management may 
have its own area committee and may meet jointly with an AUC 
at regular intervals to discuss issues which deal broadly with the 
work product in their area. The AUC meets prior to any joint 
meetings to map out the union's game plan for that meeting. 
Before any suggestions are implemented, they must be accepted 
by a joint steering committee composed of top union officials and 
top management officials. 
Unlike autonomous work groups, supervisors are not removed 
from the AUCs area, but the AUCs participation activities on the 
shopfloor exclude the participation of management and super-
vision. Under this model, those workers who are not interested 
in participating do not have to. On the other hand, if certain areas 
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are suitable for autonomous work groups, they can be imple-
mented with the assistance of that area's AUC. 
By themselves AUCs will not necessarily empower the workers 
and the union, but they provide an opportunity for doing so. By 
providing assistants to help the steward interact with the members, 
the AUCs provide the basis for the union to develop an internal 
organizing structure which can be used to mobilize the members 
behind a variety of union efforts. Though an AUC functions in 
a specified area of the company, its mission should be broadly 
defined to generate ideas for cost savings beyond the shopfloor. 
In fact, these ideas should be given priority in order to shift the 
cost savings focus away from labor costs and job-threatening 
productivity improvements. Through its direct line to the union 
steering committee, the AUC should be encouraged to generate 
ideas for special task forces to deal with the larger problems of 
mismanagement. 
Building on the union's traditional steward structure, AUCs can 
multiply the union's eyes and ears on the shopfloor, expanding 
the opportunities for members to be active in the union and 
inspiring that activity by actively soliciting membership partici-
pation in determining the overall fate of their workplace. 
A Union-Empowering Structure for Participation 
We propose a union-empowering structure for worker partici-
pation which is a combination of the area-wide union committee 
and the special task force. With such a model, the union will be 
able to use the task force structure to investigate multi-level issues 
throughout the institution. And, the Area-wide Union Committee 
will give the union a permanent structure with which to organize 
its members' participation in management decision-making and 
other union activities. This dual structure also allows the AUCs 
to act as important sources of ideas for special task forces and 
as a means to identify future STF members. 
To visually describe the difference between our union-
empowering structure and the traditional QWL/EI model, we 
include three diagrams. 
Figure One is an organizational chart depicting a traditional labor 
relations structure at a typical unionized workplace. For purposes 
of this discussion, the key features in Figure One are threefold. 
First, the union has a corresponding relationship with each level 
of the company. The president of the union interacts directly with 
the president of the company. Each chief steward interacts with 
a company director for a specific area within the company's 
[ 
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operation. Each steward relates to those rank-and-file members 
under the jurisdiction of a specific supervisor. 
Second, the union has no structural relationship with certain 
areas of the corporation, such as finance, sales and marketing, and 
purchasing. What is decided in these areas has a major impact 
on the workplace, but the union has little, if any, impact on those 
decisions. 
Third, if the diagram were folded or cut vertically in half, the 
part which describes the union's involvement within the company 
would now describe how the union operates as its own institution. 
This last point is of particular concern in this discussion because 
most QWL/EI programs which profess union involvement, involve 
unions in ways which have no direct relationship with the basic 
union structure. 
This is readily apparent when we look at Figure Two, which is 
a generic diagram of a typical QWL or EI program in a unionized 
setting. At the center of this maze of circles is the Labor-
Management Policy Committee, which includes the top decision-
makers from both management and the union. Arrayed around 
the big LMC are a series of departmental and subdepartmental 
LMCs, which include management representatives and hourly 
workers (who are not necessarily and not usually union represen-
tatives, though union members). All ideas and suggestions from 
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the little LMCs are funnelled into the Labor-Management Policy 
Committee, where both the union and management have an 
opportunity to veto any suggestions. 
Figure Two portrays the worker participation process as entirely 
autonomous from both the union structure and the basic corporate 
structure, both of which are seen to relate to the process only in 
the central decision-making body. As concerns the union structure, 
this is usually an accurate depiction of the reality. In most 
instances, the union's steward system and even most of its 
executive board is totally removed from the process. But as it 
concerns the corporate structure, Figure Two falsifies the reality. 
The corporate structure not only remains in place, it impinges on 
every aspect of the participation process because the top manage-
ment which meets on supposedly equal ground with the union 
in the big LMC has control of its managers and supervisors in a 
way the union does not and cannot have of its membership. 
Through the various levels of management structure, management 
has a line of communications and control that the union does not 
have. 
Of course, unlike Figure One, this diagram cannot be folded or 
cut in any manner which would describe how the union functions 
as an independent institution. Clearly, models of worker partici-
pation patterned on Figure Two at best ignore the primary role 
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of unions in the company and at worst subvert the union's role 
and power. 
In Figure Three we demonstrate how a union-empowering 
model of worker participation would appear schematically. This 
particular diagram was developed by Banks with TVansport 
Workers Union Local 291, which represents 1,600 bus and rail 
employees at the Metro-Dade TVansportation Administration 
(MDTA) in Miami. A similar model was the basis for union-
initiated programs at Eastern Air Lines, Western Air Lines and 
the transit authority in Philadelphia. 
In essence, the program represented by Figure Three is the 
periodic joining together of two separate programs, the union's 
and management's, in the same way that Figure One demonstrates 
the coming together of the union and management for purposes 
of collective bargaining and contract administration. Each half of 
the program has its own constituency, and each party retains its 
exclusive access to that constituency. Thus, the local union leader-
ship has control over the apparatus of the program which deals 
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with the rank and file, while management communicates its 
program through its supervisors. 
The union-empowering model of participation is overseen, on 
the union side, by a union steering committee composed of the 
top officers of the union. This group reviews all proposals from 
the union side before they are presented to the joint union-
management steering committee. The joint committee is composed 
of the union steering committee and a management steering 
committee with an equal number of the enterprise's top managers. 
The union coordinates its various participation activities through 
a full-time coordinator (or team of coordinators) who acts as the 
staff of the union steering committee. It is the union coordinator's 
job to arrange for training and to assure access to information for 
the various union participation groups. 
With this model, participation takes place in two ways. First, 
the Area-wide Union Committee undertakes a variety of canvas-
sing and small-group activities to solicit ideas from the workforce 
and develops them into proposals for change. More area-specific 
proposals can be presented to management through the Area-wide 
Joint Committee, though they would be reviewed by the union 
coordinator and union steering committee before being offered 
for final approval to the joint steering committee. But some of the 
suggestions solicited by the AUCs should be pushed up to the 
union coordinator for possible formation of a Special Task Force, 
which is the second mode of participation. Where an STF is 
formed, it should include rank-and-file workers who initially made 
the suggestion for broader changes in management practices. 
Both modes of participation require a sifting process on the part 
of th anion leadership—the AUC members, the union coordinator 
and the union steering committee—before any proposal is 
presented to management. "Jointness" in this kind of program 
occurs only at the representative level, in joint committees which 
in Figure Three are represented by circles, and only after the union 
has thoroughly explored the negative and positive potential of any 
workplace change. But while the union thereby maintains control 
of the participation process, the proposed changes can only be 
implemented if management agrees. 
Thus, the union needs management's cooperation in order to 
fully implement a program like that sketched in Figure Three. 
Management has to pay the salary of the full-time union coordi-
nator (s) and lost time for participants in the AUCs activities, and 
it has to authorize its personnel to release management infor-
mation to the STFs. But most of the worker participation part of 
the program operates autonomously as a union-directed activity. 
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Like Figure One, Figure Three can be folded or cut vertically in 
half, and a clear union structure is revealed to the left of the circles 
representing the joint part of the program. 
To see how a union-empowering participation program would 
work in practice, let's take a hypothetical situation involving Local 
One representing workers at Urban Pest Control (UPC) Inc. 
Though purely fictional, this case is an amalgam of elements we 
have witnessed in one actual case or another. 
Pest Control at Local One 
Local One represents all hourly workers at UPC Inc., a large 
urban pest control company which has recently been purchased 
by a huge food processing conglomerate. During the first negotia-
tions between the new owners and Local One, management insists 
on establishing a joint labor-management program, and Local One 
insists that this program be established to empower the union. 
The terms of the new program allow the union to set up Area-
wide Union Committees (AUC) headed by each area's shop 
steward. Each steward, in turn, solicits two volunteers from the 
rank and file to be on the AUC. The union is able to establish AUCs 
in three areas—in fleet maintenance, where the company's trucks 
are serviced; among the service representatives who actually spray 
and fumigate houses and lawns; and in the laboratory where the 
pest control chemicals are mixed. The union appoints as full-time 
coordinator of the program its First Vice President, Joe Hill. Hill 
has always been particularly passionate about the issue of 
mismanagement ("They're running the company into the ground 
and then coming to us for wage cuts!"). 
At a union training program Joe Hill teaches the new AUC 
members about union history, how the corporation's structure 
works, and how to read the balance sheet in the company's annual 
report. They learn how the program is supposed to help the 
stewards, and some techniques in talking one-on-one with the 
members. They also discover that one of the reasons UPC manage-
ment agreed to the new program is because the food processing 
industry traditionally has higher profit margins than the pest 
control industry and local managers are nervous about their own 
job security. Of particular concern to local management is the 
scheduled visit later in the year by a top corporate audit team. 
The fleet maintenance AUC canvasses its members and 
discovers that almost everyone is upset that fleet maintenance 
averages 15 hours per employee per week in overtime. Joe Hill 
and the union's financial consultant help the AUC calculate that 
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by hiring ten new employees, fleet maintenance could save the 
company $100,000 a year in overtime costs and reduce the weekly 
overtime average to three hours. 
The lab techs use their AUC to cost out the feasibility of 
purchasing a new mixer, which would give them greater control 
over inventory and make the company less reliant on the outside 
contractors who too often mix the chemicals improperly. Consid-
ering the costs of the mixer and the additional machine operator, 
the Lab AUC estimates that after the initial investment was paid 
off in a year and a half, the new machine would save UPC $73,000 
annually. 
The service reps' AUC also looks at outside vendors and 
discovers, to its surprise, that the company is paying 5 cents a 
gallon too much for gasoline and that the fuel distributor is the 
brother-in-law of UPC's Vice President of Purchasing. 
When the AUCs meet with their respective Area Management 
Committees (AMCs) to discuss their proposals, the response is less 
than enthusiastic. The overtime proposal from fleet maintenance 
is rejected out-of-hand because management believes that in every 
case overtime is cheaper than hiring new workers. The manage-
ment committee in the lab says that their proposal warrants 
further study, but that new equipment expenditures cannot be 
considered until the new fiscal year. The AMC members in the 
service area say they can't touch the gasoline proposal because 
it is a "hot potato." 
In most "jointness" programs the union would have very few 
options remaining at this point. But this is not the case with Local 
One. First, Joe Hill assembles the heads of the various AUCs to 
allow each group to exchange their ideas and talk about the 
problems they are having with management. Next, using the 
surveying techniques learned in the union's training sessions, the 
AUC representatives solicit signatures on survey forms from 
workers in their areas to demonstrate rank-and-file support for 
the union's three proposals. Hill then thoroughly briefs the union 
president and the union steering committee about the three AUC 
proposals and provides the union committee with the appropriate 
documentation. 
Prior to the next company-wide joint union-management 
committee meeting, Local One's president visits UPC's president 
and assures him that the union would rather implement the three 
AUC proposals before the auditors come at the end of the month. 
This way UPC management can share the credit with the union 
for developing the cost-saving ideas. At the joint steering com-
mittee meeting, the union members of the committee discuss the 
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three AUC proposals, using the supporting documents and survey 
results which show broad support by the rank and file. The 
company agrees to the proposals and they are implemented. 
In our hypothetical example, the union, with management 
cooperation and funding, is able to develop its program across the 
workforce. By involving its members in the program and showing 
how vital the union is in protecting the members as it 
systematically uncovers and corrects a variety of forms of mis-
management, Local One strengthens itself and improves the 
company's economic prospects at the same time. 
Of course, things won't always work this well. One thing that 
can always go wrong is that workers participating in the program 
may develop a cost-saving proposal that is bad for the union. For 
example, in the UPC case, the fleet maintenance workers might 
suggest changing the current daily eight-hour overtime provision 
to a practice which only pays overtime rates after a worker reaches 
a 40-hour week. This too would save the company money, but 
it would not improve the workers' lot and it would jeopardize the 
rights of all bargaining unit members. In this case, the union's 
coordinator, Joe Hill, would educate the fleet maintenance AUC 
members on how their proposal could hurt the very workers the 
program is designed to help and how the proposal could be reform-
ulated to meet cost-saving and union goals. Hill would also alert 
the union steering committee to be on watch at the next joint 
steering committee meeting. In the event management tried to 
sneak by the proposal at this meeting, the union would be able 
to exercise its veto. 
Another problem that can be expected to crop up is that manage-
ment will find that cooperating with a strong worker participa-
tion program is very stressful. Management might withdraw its 
cooperation at any time. If so, the union might grieve the issue, 
or it might decide the best strategy is to do nothing until the 
contract expires and raise the issue of mismanagement at that time. 
When company bargainers plead poverty during the negotiations, 
the union can always point to UPC's past unwillingness to deal 
with union-identified waste and mismanagement. 
But if the union decides that continuing the worker participation 
program is in its best interests, it has many tactics available to 
pressure management to cooperate. And if the union has used 
company resources during the cooperative period to organize its 
members and expand the program, it should be in an even better 
position to apply or threaten such tactics. The next chapter will 
revisit UPC to show what happens when management refuses to 
cooperate, or decides to stop cooperating, with a union-
Participating in Management 41 
empowering worker participation program. 
With or without management's cooperation, however, a union-
empowering worker participation program requires a level of 
internal union organization and membership participation that is 
rare among unions today. But it also provides a concrete way to 
generate a high degree of organization and participation. And that's 





The program for worker participation we have outlined attempts 
to build on the experience and traditions of unionists in collective 
bargaining within a traditional U.S. labor relations structure. But 
this is not because we are uncritical of all union traditions. Implicit 
in the program we advocate is a critique of what has been called 
the service model of unionism and an advocacy for a return in 
force to an organizing model. 
Briefly, a service model of unionism defines union leadership 
as solving problems for the membership on the basis of members' 
requests or complaints. This puts most members in a passive 
relation to the union as mere recipients of services for which they 
pay dues. An organizing model, on the other hand, tries to 
stimulate and involve the membership in solving problems 
through group processes and collective action. The labor move-
ment has long used both models, but current practice is far too 
heavily weighted toward the union as a service organization. (See 
Numbers That Count: A Manual on Internal Organizing.) 
In this final chapter we want to develop this distinction by 
answering three objections to our program that many unionists 
are likely to raise: 
1) "It sounds great from a union perspective. But management 
would never agree to anything like this." 
2) "Without management cooperation, and the promise of some 
concrete payoffs, our members wouldn't be organizable around 
these issues. Hell, we can't even get them to attend union 
meetings." 
3) "Yeah, great, I can see how we can do something like this 
in our union. But the labor movement as a whole is never going 
to move in this direction. It's too much work to do all the organ-
izing that's necessary." 
The first two objections here are much more telling when based, 
as they usually are, on a vision of unions that neglects their 
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potential for internal organizing. As concerns the labor movement 
as a whole, we will present evidence of a gathering tendency 
toward the use of an organizing model of unionism. 
"Management Will Never Buy Into This" 
The mission of a union-empowering worker participation 
program is to improve the economic prospects of an enterprise 
in order to preserve and enhance workers' wages and standards. 
Worker participation can improve quality, cut costs and enhance 
productivity in the long run. This is why management should 
cooperate with it. But, as the case of Frank Borman shows, 
management will inherently resist and even destroy any approach 
that threatens its prerogatives and sense of control—what Borman 
referred to as "the monkeys running the zoo." 
Unions need to be prepared to organize their membership to 
exert pressure on management by subjecting them to embarass-
ment and ridicule. It is wrong to assume that management's first 
priority is the welfare of the enterprise. In most instances, they 
have a much weaker stake in a company or a public agency than 
the workforce does. Their top priority is their own careers, and 
the union must strive to convince managers that their careers are 
best advanced by cooperating with union-empowering worker 
participation. 
One of the most promising aspects of our model is that the 
worker participation program can occur with or without manage-
ment cooperation and that unions can shift from one form to 
another, depending on circumstances. 
To see how this might work, let's go back to the hypothetical 
example of Urban Pest Control, but now let's assume that manage-
ment and the union cannot agree to cooperate on a worker parti-
cipation program. UPC management asks Local One to agree to 
a joint program which the union sees as undermining rank-and-
file identification with the union. In response, Local One's leader-
ship proposes a worker participation program like the one outlined 
in Chapter Three, but management rejects the proposal as a crass 
power play by the union. 
Instead of giving up, the union develops the program as best 
it can on its own. The coordinator, Joe Hill, proceeds in this case, 
where management has refused to cooperate, exactly as he did 
in the case where management agreed to cooperate. He establishes 
Area-wide Union Committees wherever the steward is enthusi-
astic about worker participation, and he trains the AUC members 
in the skills they will need. In the process of the training, union 
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members learn that UPC management is nervously preparing for 
a visit later in the year by a top corporate audit team: everyone 
agrees that this is a hook the union can use to interest manage-
ment in the union's participation program. 
The AUCs come up with the same recommendations as in our 
previous example: hire more maintenance workers to cut down 
on overtime; stop buying fuel from a high-cost supplier who's a 
relative of the Vice-President for Purchasing; buy a new mixer 
to increase quality and reduce reliance on outside contractors. 
Each of the AUCs present their proposals to Joe Hill and then to 
the union steering committee—the union's top officers. 
The union steering committee is concerned about shoring up 
membership support for the AUC proposal in the maintenance 
shop. It asks the AUC to circulate a petition among maintenance 
workers to establish that at least two-thirds of them favor the 
reduction of overtime, which of course means reduction in take-
home pay as well. The steward argues that this is not necessary, 
since, except for a couple of "work hogs," sentiment among the 
workers is overwhelming, but the steering committee insists that 
the AUC document this sentiment and build support among the 
members for a fight on this issue. The other two AUCs are also 
asked to fully document both the cost-savings anticipated from 
their proposals and membership support for the proposals. 
One month before the top corporate audit team arrives, the 
union again presents its worker participation proposal to manage-
ment. Leading with the fuel overcharge, and presenting detailed 
calculations on the misuse of overtime and on the feasibility of 
buying a new mixer, the union also refers vaguely to "other 
proposals" that could save the company substantially. The union 
president warns management that if the company rejects these 
proposals, the union will "go public" by presenting these and 
"other proposals" to the corporate audit team. 
After examining the calculations in the union proposals, manage-
ment is convinced that the union program promises real cost 
savings. In addition, while the fuel overcharge involves a relatively 
minimal sum, it could lead to more than one manager being fired. 
Because the union has won credibility with its fully documented 
proposals, management cannot dismiss the union's vague 
reference to other proposals that it has not revealed. Though 
management could implement all of the union's specific proposals 
without agreeing to a union-empowering worker participation 
program, management can't be sure what other embarassing data 
the union might be able to show the corporate audit team. UPC 
management panics, and agrees to the union's program. 
/ 
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In this case, Local One's tactics forced management to cooperate 
and fund the union's worker participation program. By involving 
more and more of its membership in the program and showing 
how vital the union is in protecting the membership by uncovering 
and correcting a variety of forms of mismanagement, the union 
strengthened itself internally while at the same time improving 
the company's economic prospects. 
In this fictional story, we assured a happy ending by assuming 
that UPC management feared a corporate audit. But unions have 
similar power even where there is no audit for local management 
to fear. First, most bosses themselves have bosses whom they fear, 
and the AUCs can pit one level of management against other levels 
in a variety of settings. Second, unions can always threaten to go 
public with charges of mismanagement. In our hypothetical case 
with UPC, Local One could publicize its three cost-saving propo-
sals in the union newspaper or print up a special leaflet about 
mismanagement at UPC to be distributed by the stewards to the 
membership. The union's members could be asked to sign a peti-
tion to UPC management urging it to change its position or at least 
justify its decision to ignore the cost-saving proposals. All this 
could make an interesting story in the local newspaper—"Union 
Fights Mismanagement at UPC"—which could then be photo-
copied and sent to stockholders and corporate headquarters. In 
such a public campaign, customers might find out about the 
inconsistent quality of the pest control chemicals. In the same vein 
the union could sponsor a company-wide rally against bad 
management or a joint rally with neighborhood community groups 
demanding more jobs (which the overtime and new equipment 
proposals would provide.) 
In short, if the union educates and mobilizes its members within 
the worker participation program, it does not need to depend on 
management good will, or even on its good sense. 
Too Much Organizing? 
Union leaders from staff reps to shop stewards often complain 
about the apathy of their members, and many could not imagine 
organizing and mobilizing the extensive membership participation 
required in our model. Much of this perceived apathy is based 
on looking at the membership through the lens of a service model 
of unionism. If the union presents itself as a service which requires 
nothing more from its "clients" than to pay for the service, then 
it should not be surprised if the clients don't show up for union 
meetings. 
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Organizers, by contrast, instinctively look for the issues that can 
galvanize people and the people who can provide new leadership 
around those issues. Mismanagement provides a wide range of 
issues about which many workers care deeply, and a union-led 
participative management program provides a means to tap these 
concerns and to develop new leadership around them. 
To illustrate this, we'd like to retell a story that originally 
appeared in Labor Research Review #10 (Mismanagement & What 
Unions Can Do About It, Spring 1987). Because it involves a 
situation much worse than most unions face, it should cause some 
second thoughts about the impossibility of overcoming supposed 
membership apathy. 
The Randall Company in Blytheville, Arkansas, employs about 
300 workers represented by UAW Local 1249. The automotive 
parts manufacturer had broken the union's strike in 1977, and 
management had unilaterally imposed work rules, frozen wages, 
and voided the union's right to dues check-off. Arkansas is a right-
to-work state, and only 20 workers still belonged to the union 
when in early 1984 it began a campaign around product quality. 
Based on rumors that the Big Three auto companies were going 
to drop suppliers who had poor quality records, the union 
approached management with a proposal to improve product 
quality. Part of the proposal included the protections of a union 
contract. Management turned down the union proposal, and Local 
1249 responded by creating what it called a Quality Audit Team 
(QAT). The union took two months to select and train 30 of the 
most trusted workers from key areas and from all shifts who were 
identified by their UAW t-shirts which proclaimed "Safety, Quality, 
and Union Rights." 
By involving the rest of the Randall workforce in systematically 
monitoring quality, the QAT team pieced together its own detailed 
weekly inventory of the quality of all parts and where these parts 
were shipped. When Randall management was informed of 
specific product quality problems and refused to remedy the 
situation, the Quality Audit Team kept a record of the incident. 
Many of Randall's customers are companies which are also 
represented by UAW locals. These UAW locals were informed by 
Local 1249 of the defective merchandise which management had 
forced its quality-conscious workforce to ship. Eventually, Randall 
customers discovered management's complacency with quality, 
and over 700 customer complaints were received by management 
in less than a year. The union was even able to bring up the issue 
during UAW-GM negotiations, documenting for General Motors 
that a major GM supplier, Randall, was shipping it defective parts. 
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As the quality campaign against Randall management intensi-
fied, so did the enthusiasm of the workers for their union. By the 
end of 1984 the Quality Audit Team had involved so many Randall 
workers in the campaign that 85% of the employees had signed 
union membership cards and over 100 were paying their dues on 
a regular basis. When Randall management gave the workers 
unilateral pay increases of $1.20 per hour over two years, they 
knew their collective effort at management quality control was 
beginning to pay off. 
There are many lessons to be learned from the Randall story. 
First, by structuring its Quality Audit Team on the basis of a 
traditional organizing committee or union shop committee, the 
union was able to function as a union during its campaign for 
product quality. Second, the union asserted its influence and 
showed its potential to make a difference in management's 
exclusive domain of product quality—without management's 
cooperation. Third, the union's worker participation program was 
successfully used as a means of organizing the workers into an 
aggressive union where more traditional means such as filing labor 
board charges had failed. 
The Organizing Model of Unionism 
The U.S. labor movement is a complex mosaic of different forces 
and tendencies. It is easy to be depressed and cynical about the 
movement's potential to revitalize itself and reverse its precipitous 
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decline. But as the permanent nature of its crisis becomes more 
and more apparent, various elements within the labor movement 
have begun to return in force to an organizing model of unionism. 
This tendency was greatly strengthened in 1988 when the AFL-
CIO Department of Organization and Field Services produced an 
internal organizing manual, Numbers That Count, that articulates 
a stinging critique of service unionism and provides guidelines 
for unions to develop their internal organizing capacity. 
Most labor leaders view internal organizing as the process of 
recruiting new members in those unionized workplaces which 
have no union shop provision in their contracts. While the 
methods described in the AFL-CIO manual are useful for this 
purpose also, the manual is written with a much broader definition 
of internal organizing in mind. In the process of defining the term 
"internal organizing," the AFL-CIO also projects a dramatic vision 
of how unions should function if they wish to meet the challenges 
facing all unions in today's menacing environment. 
The service model of unionism has experienced prominence 
only in the past 30 years, though aspects of it have existed at one 
time or another for the past 100 years. It is the predominate form 
of unionism in the United States today. At its basis is an assump-
tion that unions are professional organizations which employ a 
staff or full-time officers to solve problems for union members. 
Under thb model of unionism, members purchase a service that 
will protect them against the arbitrary actions of the employer and 
that will deliver higher wages and benefits on a regular basis. 
There is an extremely strong reliance by service-oriented unions 
on the codified system of collective bargaining and contract 
administration that has developed since World War II. In order 
to achieve national production stability, this system sought to take 
matters out of the hands of committees of workers. Instead, the 
objective was to make labor relations a profession which utilizes 
union professionals, management professionals, and professional 
neutrals to adjust the outcome of most disputes. Rather than 
rallying the troops around shopfloor issues, unions teach their 
stewards to write grievances and prepare for arbitration. Under 
the service model, unions settle disputes not by a show of force, 
but by a reasoned argument before an arbitrator and far away from 
the shopfloor. 
This dependence on bureaucratic processes has sapped unions 
of their ability to put pressure on management. Nowadays, service-
oriented unions find themselves having to follow elaborate rules 
in an industral relations system which has become easy for union-
avoidance attorneys to manipulate. With its reliance on hearings 
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and lawyers, the system is very expensive, and management has 
figured out a formula to impede or even break unions. Manage-
ment's motto has become: it's the union's lawyers against our 
lawyers and we can afford more lawyers. 
Union staff complain that they are servicing the 10% of the 
members who have problems and not the 90% who don't. In 
reality, they are saying the service model of unionism is only 
geared to the needs of the 10% who have complaints that are 
grievable under the terms of the contract. The irony is that now 
management has found ways to overload and frustrate the 
grievance process to such a degree that unions are often not even 
able to effectively service the 10%. 
Various elements of the labor movement have come to realize 
that the service model of unionism is no longer functional in 
today's world. It is becoming increasingly apparent that for unions 
to even provide decent services to their members, they must once 
again adopt an organizing model of unionism. 
The organizing model is a form of unionism which doesn't solve 
problems for people; rather, it finds ways of getting union 
members involved in solving the problems. The key component 
of the organizing model is its emphasis on mobilization of the rank 
and file to do the work of the union. The organizing model was 
the major form of unionism in the U.S. prior to the 1950s, and 
almost all the major unions were originally founded on its 
principles. As its name implies, the organizing model of unions 
uses the same techniques, principles and structures that successful 
union organizers use to win union representation elections at 
unorganized worksites. 
The organizing model is more effective than the service model 
because people and institutions respond more readily to the 
appeals of large groups than to the requests of individuals. Because 
the organizing model requires the involvement and mobilization 
of the rank and file, unions that adopt this model find it easier 
to turn out large groups of people on picket lines, at rallies, and 
at city council meetings. Employers are more likely to bargain 
fairly if their workers are very vocal and visible about their support 
for the union's bargaining demands. 
The organizing model gives members a sense of power as a 
group. When the members share in the decisions and all the 
activities of the union, they will also be sharing in the victories. 
When people see that their own involvement with others contri-
butes to organizational success, they create stronger bonds and 
develop a closer identity with the union. It is ironic to see union 
halls across America display the slogan "You Are the Union." 
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Instead of acting upon this slogan and working hard to find ways 
to get the members involved, service model union leaders take 
short cuts and do things without the workers. By separating the 
union's activities from the members, unions act like a "third party 
provider" like Blue Cross/Blue Shield—the members are glad they 
have it, but it hardly inspires loyalty to and affection for the 
organization. If there is a shopfloor safety problem, the steward 
files a complaint. If a contract expires, a business manager 
negotiates a contract and presents it for ratification. Instead, if 
the union would mobilize the rank and file around these same 
issues, our members would once again feel part of the union and 
part of the larger social movement which fights for justice for 
workers in so many ways. 
When union members participate directly in the resolution of 
a work-related problem, they become better educated about the 
specific issues facing unions and the broader issues affecting 
working people in general. This "education by personal experi-
ence" creates greater motivation to act upon what is learned. This 
means that even when a union loses a battle, members are more 
knowledgeable about the issue and are better prepared for the next 
fight. 
A union which follows the organizing model involves many 
more people in its daily life, and this means that it will be able 
to take on and solve more problems. This added help allows the 
union to initiate activities instead of always having to react to the 
latest employer-generated crisis. As one union officer who 
converted to the organizing model explains: "I used to be a 
constant candidate for burnout and management knew this, so 
they kept me running in circles. Now we've turned it on them. 
There are more of us than there is of them. We're practicing in-
your-face unionism." 
Recently, there have been many indications that unions are 
switching back to the organizing mcdel. Aside from the AFL-CIO's 
new manual, the federation's Industrial Union Department (IUD) 
has published its own manual called The Inside Game. In it the 
IUD explains how unions, in lieu of risking a strike which manage-
ment is prepared to break, can instead mobilize their members 
to disrupt the company's operations without striking. Other 
programs, such as the Machinists' On the Job Canvass and the 
AFL-CIO Education Department's One-On-One program, teach 
unions how to recruit and train volunteer shopfloor leaders in the 
use of important mobilization techniques such as issue develop-
ment, surveying and one-to-one communication skills. 
These efforts, and other remarkable examples of the organizing 
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model such as Jobs With Justice (which has mobilized tens of 
thousands of union members nationwide in its effort to gain public 
support for union campaigns) all have one thing in common. They 
begin by going to the shopfloor and individually inspiring rank-
and-file members to participate in their union. 
Perhaps most impressive has been the Communications 
Workers' effort at recruiting, training and maintaining a system 
of shopfloor mobilization with a ratio of one "mobilizer" for every 
20 members. As a union based in the telecommunications industry, 
CWA has experienced management's use of automation to outlast 
striking workers. By turning to its new internal organizing 
program, Mobilization CWA, the union's leaders hope to activate 
their members inside a company to accomplish what has been 
increasingly impossible by walking picket lines outside. Even 
though the program is used to strengthen the union in workplaces 
that have had bargaining rights for years, like AT&T and NYNEX, 
it is the creation of CWA's Organizing Department. With its em-
phasis on one-on-one shopfloor information gathering and distribu-
tion, Mobilization CWA bears a striking structural resemblance 
to our union-empowering model of worker participation. 
Marriage of Two Models 
Some unions who now use internal organizing as a means to 
pressure management during contract negotiations are finding it 
difficult to connect this membership activation strategy with the 
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everyday operations of the union after the new contract has been 
won. Even if we begin to use rank-and-file mobilization techniques 
to take on grievances and safety complaints (this has proven to 
be very effective where it has been tried), we must still find ways 
to reach the hearts and minds of the 90% who never have a 
grievance—those workers who view the union simply as an 
insurance policy which you pay for but hope you never have to 
use. 
We propose that the union-empowering model of worker parti-
cipation described above is the answer to the labor movement's 
dilemma of applying an organizing model to the modern work-
place. By adopting this organizing model of participation in 
management decision-making, unions will be able to expand the 
number and scope of shopfloor leaders to include issues which 
are of concern to the nongrievance sector of the workforce in a 
manner that will allow these members to experience first-hand 
the meaning of the adage "there is power in the union." 
The organizing/participation model will institutionally provide 
overworked union leaders with rank-and-file volunteers who will 
be able to expand the union's work on a day-to-day basis. By using 
on-the-job organizing techniques such as surveys, petitions and 
direct action, unions will be constantly on the watch for new 
people to be active in the program. By using charting techniques 
common to both union organizers and many QWL consultants, 
the union will be able to chart every area of the worksite, identify 
every worker, know every worker's concerns, and record the 
unique abilities and potential contribution of each individual. 
The participation program's company-wide committee structure 
and multi-level access to information will allow the union to 
identify and take immediate advantage of management mistakes. 
At the union's separate training efforts and separate committee 
meetings, members will be able to dissect, digest and discuss this 
information and decide how to build a stronger union at the same 
time that it strengthens the economic prospects of their workplace. 
By introducing participation programs based on an organizing 
model, unions will unearth major new issues with which members 
can activate greater pressure on even a reluctant management. 
The union's Area-wide Committees and Special Task Forces will 
uncover information on issues that unions rarely deal with now. 
By having a handle on important corporate issues such as invest-
ment, purchasing decisions, new product development, and 
physical plant expansion, unions will be better prepared to assert 
their influence on corporate decisions which have an impact on 
the union's ability to enhance the lives of its members and their 
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communities. The union will reach out to the rank and file to fill 
the numerous new union positions created by the participation 
program. In the process of learning how to run committees and 
small groups, and various financial and problem-solving skills, a 
whole new generation of workers will develop the skills and 
confidence necessary to lead the labor movement to face the 
challenges of a new century. 
Conclusion 
Labor in America is in a real fix. Unlike our sister unions in 
industrialized countries (and even in many developing nations), 
we are shrinking at a dramatic rate. Now, many experts believe 
that by 1995 unions will make up less than 10% of the private 
sector workforce in the U.S. It is obvious to even the most casual 
of observers that the fundamental task of labor is to recruit a larger 
share of the workforce into its ranks. 
To achieve the type of organizing successes that would begin 
to reverse its steep decline, labor must radically alter the current 
legal environment which offers workers and unions almost no 
protection to bosses who want to stay union-free. However, to win 
the sweeping legislation which is necessary to improve the legal 
environment for organizing, the labor movement needs to shape 
public opinion in its favor. And to transform public opinion, unions 
in America need to mobilize their remaining forces in a manner 
which projects an image of a movement whose struggle is not the 
fight of a special interest but a fight for the public interest. 
To be capable of sustaining the high level of commitment and 
endurance which this impending struggle will demand, the very 
perceptions which union leaders and members hold about the 
nature of the movement must be refashioned. Right now, most 
union members are consumers of unionism rather than producers 
of it. So long as union members' own image of the labor move-
ment is descriptive of the service model, we will not be able to 
muster the numbers, the resources, or the enthusiasm sufficient 
to make the necessary political changes and to attract enough new 
members into our fold. Labor in the U.S. will have a good chance 
at making a comeback only when the ethos of the movement is 
so transformed that those who now belong to unions take an active 
role in nurturing and building both their unions and their 
workplaces. 
This transformed self-image of the labor movement will only 
happen when organizing becomes the norm, the everyday experi-
ence of unionists on the shopfloor. It is encouraging to see that 
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labor officials are beginning to look towards their organizing staff 
for solutions to what are essentially problems with collective 
bargaining relations. These organizers are transforming the various 
worker-empowering methods they have developed during external 
organizing drives into a means by which unions can reverse the 
decline in power found in most organized workplaces. They are 
doing this by reintroducing the very organizing committee 
structures that are usually dismantled shortly after unions win 
their first contract. A monumental opportunity will be lost if this 
new breed of internal organizers neglect the potential that parti-
cipation programs offer as a way to institutionalize the organizing 
model in the workplace. 
Though aspects of the service model will always be necessary, 
the current imbalance between the organizing and the service 
aspects of unions is the primary cause of labor's present demise. 
The fundamental task confronting the labor movement is the 
challenge to switch from a reliance on the service model of 
unionism to an organizing model. In the work environment of the 
1990s, we will find that the union-empowering approach to worker 
participation lends itself well as a means for the labor movement 
to convert back to an organizing model and wrestle back from 
management control of the shopfloor. Unlike the service model 
of unions, the organizing/participation models do not depend on 
a cooperative management. By reintegrating organizing back into 
its' daily life, the labor movement will rediscover what our 
forebears knew all too well: Organizing never stops. • 
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